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WHY WE NEED TERM LIMITS FOR CONGRESS:
FOUR IN THE SENATE, TEN IN THE HOUSE
RICHARD

A. EPSTEIN*

I. INTRODUCTION: TERM LIMITS ALL OVER AGAIN
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,' a closely divided United States
Supreme Court held that individual states could not impose term limits on
their members of Congress.2 On its facts, the decision was quite close, but
on balance Justice Stevens had the better argument when he held that the
Constitution sets the sole qualifications for election to the Senate or the
House. On matters that affect the entire nation, establishing uniform state
requirements makes commendable sense.4 To be sure, US. Term Limits
addressed a very close and difficult question of constitutional interpretation.
Many have sufficiently addressed the pros and cons of that decision, so I
will not recanvass it.5 Rather, I will argue in this short Article that the case
for imposing term limits is sufficiently compelling that it should be
introduced by constitutional amendment at the national level, so that it is
equally binding on all states.
In adopting term limits, I think it is unwise to insist upon adopting two
terms in the Senate and three terms in the House, as Arkansas did in US.
Term Limits.6 Rather, my position allows for far longer terms than the
earlier proposal: four in the Senate and ten in the House. But even in this
more restrained form, it should ultimately have major consequences. In
order to make out this case, I shall proceed as follows. In Part II, I shall
explain why both sides of the term-limits debate are mistaken in appealing
to some notion of "the people." The real issue is the dangerous prisoner's
dilemma game that arises whenever representatives of a national party are
chosen along territorial lines.7 In Part III, I explain why longer terms for
both House and Senate members will thread the needle between excessive
* Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, Peter
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, and senior lecturer at the
University of Chicago.
1. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
2. Id. at 783.
3. Id. at 782; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3
(enumerating the eligibility requirements to serve as a member of Congress).
4. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 356 (Ark. 1994).
5. See U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 837.
6. See id at 783.
7.

See ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA: A STUDY

INCONFLICT AND COOPERATION 13 (1965) ("In the game called Prisoner's Dilemma, the
rational choice of strategy by both players leads to an outcome which is worse for both than
if they had chosen their strategies 'irrationally.'").
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turnover in government on one side and entrenched, corrupt leadership on
the other.
II. THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME
One of the most notable features of the opinions in U.S. Term Limits is
the broader arguments to which each side appealed in order to demonstrate
that its view was the most consistent with the highest values of democracy.
As so often happens in constitutional adjudication, each side sought to wrap
itself in the mantle of "the people," the highest authority in democratic
politics. 8 For these purposes, it is worth mentioning the jarring conflict
inside a document whose Preamble begins with the words "We the People,"
as if the Constitution writ large celebrated a system of popular democracy.9
Yet the moment one turns away from the soaring rhetoric of the Preamble,
the Constitution introduces a dense network of textual provisions. Many of
these provisions aim to restrain popular democratic institutions, in part with
a plethora of electoral obstacles that prohibit simple political majorities
from impressing their will upon the public at large.o The two
Qualifications Clauses are part of that strategy."
Notwithstanding the built-in constitutional safeguards, Justice Stevens
assures us that it is a "fundamental principle of our representative
democracy ... that the people should choose whom they please to govern
them."' 2 One corollary to that principle is "that the opportunity to be elected
[is] open to all."' And later: "[W]e recognized the critical postulate that
sovereignty is vested in the people, and that sovereignty confers on the
people the ri ht to choose freely their representatives to the National
Government." Justice Stevens's argument clearly tells us that, if everyone
should be eligible for office, then no one can be barred by term limits. Not
to be outdone, Justice Thomas referred to a different group of "the people"
in his dissent:
8. See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
9. U.S. CONsT. pmbl.; see, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING
OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 5 (2005) (arguing that "courts should take greater account

of the Constitution's democratic nature when they interpret constitutional and statutory
texts"). For criticism, see Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A ProgressiveAlternative
to Textualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2387, 2394 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)).

10. See BREYER, supra note 9, at 29 ("The Framers' goal was to 'secure the public
good and private rights against the danger of [factionalism], and at the same time to preserve
the spirit and form of popular government."').
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
12. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 793 (1995) (quoting Powell v.
McCormick, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969)) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
13. Id. at 793-94 (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 794.
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I see nothing in the Constitution that precludes the people of each State (if
they so desire) from authorizing their elected state legislators to prescribe
qualifications on their behalf. If the people of a State decide that they do
not trust their state legislature with this power, they are free to amend their
state constitution to withdraw it. This arrangement seems perfectly
consistent with the Framers' scheme.15
In my view, both sides of this debate missed the essential element by
treating an appeal to "the people" as the ultimate source of legitimacy. The
real difficulty associated with term limits arises in quite a different fashion.
In its crudest form, the objection is simply a prisoner's dilemma game that
fosters an odd sense of inversion in our constitutional structure.' 6 For
example, in the presidential election, it is the people at large who must
choose only one person to serve as President of the entire nation. At this
point, much can be said for the view that there is no reason why the people
cannot elect the President for as many terms as they choose. Nonetheless, in
the aftermath of Franklin D. Roosevelt's nearly four-term presidency, the
Twenty-Second Amendment introduced term limits for the President.' 7
Today there are no term limits for the Senate or the House. There is only a
serious prisoner's dilemma game because "the people" of one state cannot
vote out of office the longstanding senators or representatives of other
states and other districts.
All elected state officials face some conflict in balancing their state
interests with their national responsibilities. That the people of one state
cannot upend another state's senators or representatives is troublesome
because some mechanism is necessary to mediate that conflict." This
difficulty is one that the current system of democratic politics cannot
address, let alone resolve. As a matter of brute public choice theory,
reelection is one key constraint that weighs heavily on just about all
members of Congress. To gain reelection, members of Congress must meet
a powerful territorial constraint: garnering support from a majority of voters
in their district.' 9 As for campaign support, outside sentiments matter only
indirectly.
The territorial nature of our political system directs elected officials to
look locally even though their public duties extend nationally. 20 At this
15. Id. at 883 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
16. See BREYER, supra note 9, at 28 ("[T]he Constitution's structural complexity ...
[seeks] to produce a form of democracy that would prevent any single group of individuals
from exercising too much power.. . .").
17. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXII, § 1.
18. See BREYER, supra note 9, at 29.
19. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 371, 371 (1983) ("The economic approach to political
behavior assumes that actual political choices are determined by the efforts of individuals
and groups to further their own interests.").
20. See BREYER, supra note 9, at 28. In the post-revolutionary United States, "'the
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point, few politicians can resist such a great temptation. They hope to
obtain key committee positions, enter into strategic alliances, and gain
enough local publicity to persuade their constituents to support their
reelection campaigns. To accomplish these goals, elected officials are
tempted to funnel benefits back home that are disproportionate to their
district's population. 2 1 In this context, airports are for construction jobsnot national transportation-and paving "roads to nowhere" leads to
political success. This strategy is feasible because of the virtually
wealth
nonexistent constitutional constraints on the ability to redistribute
22
through various permutations of the taxing and spending power.
Length in office offers a huge advantage to those seeking localized
benefits. Although seniority does not decide everything in Congress, the
clout that accompanies long service in office remains a prominent
ingredient in obtaining political power. Constituents understand this point
well. In their role as "the people," they are quite happy to reelect those
officials who bring home the bacon, even if it comes at the expense of the
nation's overall welfare.23 There is no magic formula in appropriations that
can balance this tendency. Whether in the form of a new military base and
processing facility or a new regional office for an administrative agency,
even so-called public goods must have a designated location. The longer
one remains in office, the more constituent goodies the diligent politician
can secure, thereby reducing the voters' incentive to vote that official out of
office. This prisoner's dilemma game for the House and Senate is a true
scourge on national politics.
As I have lamented on more than one occasion, there was no way that I
could vote against Robert Byrd or Jesse Helms while a resident of Illinois,
even though removing them from public office would benefit me far more
than choosing my own senator.24 As these individuals gained clout, they
could certainly direct more goodies to their home states, while the less
powerful Illinois senators could not match their entrepreneurial activity. As
a local citizen, I envied senators and representatives from other regions who
had the clout that my elected officials so lacked. As an academic theorist,
great objects' of society were 'sacrificed constantly to local views."' Id. Groups with
"divergent social, economic, and religious interests" tended to "choose representatives . . .
for their willingness to act solely to advance [their] particular interests." Id.
21. See Burton A. Abrams & William R. Dougan, The Effects of Constitutional
Restraints on Governmental Spending, 49 PUB. CHOICE 101, 102 (1986) ("In equilibrium,
successful politicians choose the set of expenditures . . . and taxes . . . that maximize

political support.").
22. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
23. See Abrams & Dougan, supra note 21, at 102 ("[R]elatively influential groups will
be net beneficiaries of government spending, while the members of relatively weak groups
will tend to pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits from spending.").
24. JoINT COMM. ON PRINTING, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774-2005, H.R. Doc. No. 108-222, at 762,

1232-33 (2d Sess. 2005).
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however, the more pressing point was not to make sure that my district
joined the list of preferred locales, but rather to make sure that fewer
districts carried that coveted title in the first place.
Short of term limits, I do not think that there is any conceivable way in
which this could be done, at least within any sensible time horizon. In my
own distinctive take on substantive constitutional law, any government
program that by taxation and expenditure, or by direct regulation, worked a
net transfer from A to B should count as a taking that must be enjoined if
not compensated. 25 If this regime were put into place, the opportunities for
territorial manipulation would surely be reduced as big-ticket items like
ethanol subsidies for the good state of Iowa come off the table. 26
Nonetheless, there is always unevenness in the distribution of traditional
public goods, which have to be located somewhere. Perhaps good service
rules would mute the scope of competition for these plums. For instance, in
some cases, as with the closing of military bases, pressures get so strong
that an independent panel must take care of the task to ensure success.
However, the long and short of it is that reforms of this sort could easily
take decades to be introduced. Even the agricultural subsidies from the New
Deal are still very much with us as the key provisions of the Agricultural
Adjustment Acts continue in force to this very day.28 What is needed is the
short-term clout that term limits can impose.
In similar fashion, reform of the budget process can do little to stop the
skew in the distribution of public goods. 29 Even a balanced budget
25. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 286 (1985).
26.

See Roberta F. Mann & Mona L. Hymel, Moonshine to Motorfuel: Tax Incentives

for Fuel Ethanol, 19 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 43, 72-73 (2008) (discussing how
presidential candidates have used the importance of ethanol to Iowa's economy as a political
tool).
27. See Base Closure and Realignment Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2006) (creating an
independent commission to cut government costs by closing military facilities); Natalie
Hanlon, Military Base Closings: A Study of Government by Commission, 62 U. COLO. L.
REV. 331, 333-40 (1991) (following the development of the Commission for the Base
Closure and Realignment Act). On the one hand, members of Congress fought to get and
keep military bases in their own jurisdictions to funnel defense money into the state
economy. Id. at 333-34. However, in 1988 Congress faced budget pressure and authorized
the independent commission to make reports on base closings. Id. at 336. Members of
Congress were torn between fighting for military money in their respective states and cutting
the budget costs to appease voters. Id
28. See Guadalupe T. Luna, The New Deal and Food Insecurity in the "Midst of
Plenty ", 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 213, 217, 240 (2004) (noting both the legacy of the New Deal
and its particular impact on current agricultural subsidies).
29. See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures ofDecisionmaking in the Federal
Budget Process, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 387 (1998) ("The federal government's budget
decisions inevitably involve trading the demands of some groups against those of others.").
See generally Tim Westmoreland, StandardErrors: How Budget Rules DistortLawmaking,
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amendment, which attempts to limit aggregate expenditures, cannot prevent
goods' skewed distribution across different constituencies. 30 Further, the
power of the small states in the Senate, which remains a constitutional
constant, gives them a long-term advantage in this game. Public criticism
may work to slow down the skew for a short while, but the heavy hitters
can lay low while the public storm rages and reassert their traditional
prerogatives after the storm passes. Therefore, none of these options will
work to constrain factionalism. Term limits offer the best prospect of
reform.
III. LONGER TERM LIMITS

The use of term limits should have a desirable short-term effect.
Rotation in and out of office, an ancient practice, was designed to limit the
corrosive effects of time in public service.3 ' A constitutional amendment for
term limits could push this concept along mightily by refusing to exempt
entirely those individuals who now hold public office. Under this new termlimit amendment, incumbent senators who are over the four-term limit
would be able to finish their current terms and hold office for one additional
term. A similar solution would hold in the House. Those who have been in
office under five terms in the House would be immediately subject to the
rule. However, those House members who have served between five and
ten terms would get one additional term. Consequently, the outward
procession of Congress would start sooner rather than later.
The point of longer terms than those adopted by Arkansas in U.S. Term
Limits is clear enough. Three terms in the House, is, for sure, too short.32 In
effect, a three-term House limit would require a rotation in and out of office
of one-third of the House membership every two years, leading to massive
disruption in government operations and the loss of any acquired expertise
of particular House members.33 Undermining the institutional memory of
95 GEo. L.J. 1555 (2007) (explaining how the federal budget process has created skewing of
congressional choices).
30. See Theodore P. Seto, Draftinga FederalBalanced Budget Amendment That Does
What It Is Supposed to Do (And No More), 106 YALE L.J. 1449, 1461-62 (1997) (discussing
how the scarcity of public goods supports one rationale behind a balanced budget).
31. See Mark P. Petracca, Do Term Limits Rob Voters of Democratic Rights? An
Evaluation and Response, 20 W. ST. U. L. REv. 547, 564 (1993) ("Throughout history, from
the Athenian and Roman experiments with democracy and the writings of the English
Commonwealthmen in the 17th and 18th centuries to advocacy by America's
revolutionaries, the principle of rotation in office was an institutional feature of a legislative
body.") (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 563 (linking the historical concept of rotation in
office to the modem concept of term limits).
32. See 141 CONG. REc. 9723 (1995) (proposed amendment for three-term limit in the
House).
33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I (requiring members of the House to be chosen
every second year).

HeinOnline -- 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 854 2010-2011

2011]

TERM LIMITS FOR CONGRESS

855

the House could easily destabilize short-term politics and result in
inordinate influence by key staff members, who could take over the reins of
power. When the House term limit moves up to ten terms from three, the
rate of rotation in equilibrium now slows down. At each election cycle, ten
percent of members have to leave, and probably another five percent or so
will leave for a variety of reasons, including defeat at the polls. Yet the
members of the House that remain should be able to carry on in an orderly
fashion. A similar set of arguments applies to the Senate, where the rate of
turnover is only slightly higher.34
To get some idea of what congressional term limits could do, just think
of what they would have done to the careers of some of the most notable
figures in both houses of Congress. Start with the barons of the House who
would have lost office under these rules. That list includes just about all of
the Speakers of the House: 35 Sam Rayburn, who served forty-eight years;36
John McCormack, who served for forty-three years;3 7 Jim Wright, who
clocked in at thirty-four years;38 and Nancy Pelosi, who is still active with
twenty-three years in office and assumed the speakership in her twentieth
year in office.39 A quick look on the Senate side shows such notables as
Lyndon B. Johnson with twelve years each in the House and in the Senate,
where he served as majority leader for his last six years.4 0 His rapid rise in
the Senate was due, in part, to his earlier experience in the House, and I see
no reason to be unduly worried about the switch between the two chambers.
Few can make it from the House to Senate, and few will choose to make the
return trip from Senate to House. The two longest-serving senators were
Robert Byrd4 ' and Strom Thurmond,42 each with close to sixty years in
office. Another notable senator, Ted Kennedy, served for forty-seven
years. 43 Ten terms could make a huge difference in the House. The fourterm limit in the Senate could also transform that body, in general, for the
better.
Note that under the current rules, these individuals did not come to
power in either the House or Senate during the early part of their careers, in
34. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the "Continuing Body" Theory of the
Senate, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1401, 1436-37 (2010) (comparing rate of reelection for incumbents
in the House and the Senate).
35. See generally House History: Speakers of the House, OFF. CLERK U.S.
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/arthistory/house-history/speakers.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2011) (listing House Speakers from 1789 to 2011).
36. JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS: 1774-2004, H.R. Doc. No. 108-222, at 1787-88 (2005).
37. Id. at 1533.
38. Id. at 2203.
39. Id. at 1718.
40. Id. at 1339.
41. Id. at 762.
42. Id. at 2045.
43. Id. at 1371-72.
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part because senior officials stood in their way. Yet that is exactly why
there is much to be said for having a rapid rotation so that abler people can
rise more quickly to the top. In addition, the mindset of those people who
know that they are about to leave, like those who are just entering, is likely
to be somewhat less statist than might otherwise be the case. A system of
rotation ensures, moreover, that the government will not become a geriatric
society in which a disproportionate influence rests in the hands of
individuals who are likely to plump hard to Social Security and Medicare
entitlements. The new brush will sweep clean.
The question then arises whether imposing term limits has the
downside of driving out individuals from government who belong there on
their individual merits. No one could doubt that this outcome would occur
in some cases. But it is a mistake to think that the issue is one that should
dominate the discussion on this matter. Like so many other questions, this
one boils down to a clear assessment of two kinds of error. The first of
these is the error of keeping people in office who should be out. In my
view, the longer the passage of time, the more likely it is that this form of
error will dominate. Worse still, the harm that comes from continued
excessive influence based on seniority only gets worse with age. But on the
other side, those individuals who are forced out of office in their prime still
have useful lives ahead of them. They can run for other political offices or
undertake other useful endeavors. In short, there are ways to correct
through individual action the mistakes that arise when people are forced out
of office, but it is far harder to take corrective steps against entrenched
government representatives with the capacity to barricade themselves in
office.
CONCLUSION

One notable feature about the term-limits movement is that virtually all
of its ardent supporters hold a small government, libertarian orientation. I
can recall attending meetings of the Cato Institute," where a report on term
limits was a standard agenda item, about which there was no substantive
disagreement. The compliment is returned on the other side of the aisle.
Most of the term limit opponents are far more comfortable with the large
welfare state. I doubt that this is a coincidence. Indeed, I think that the
support for the term limit movement is part and parcel of a smallgovernment approach that should be defended, especially in these hard
times, on the grounds that, given where we now stand, more government is
worse government.
The great tactical mistake of the earlier generation of term-limit
supporters is that they often had a not-so-covert desire to cripple
government. I do not. Even limited governments have huge amounts of
44. See CATO INsTuTE, http://www.cato.org (last visited May 1, 2011).
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constructive things that they can and must do. The case for term limits is
much like the case for exit rights under federalism. 45 It does not necessarily
lead to any particular substantive result, but it creates an environment that,
on balance, will tend to shrink government when that change is most
needed. That gamble is, of course, no different from the original gamble of
the Framers that devices intended to reduce government power would do
better, on average, than those devices intended to expand it. The air is now
out of the term-limits movement,46 but as the reaction to the current malaise
increases, voters from all parties should come to realize that a new broom
that sweeps relentlessly clean is yet another of the structural protections that
form the nondemocratic backbone of a sound and stable democratic society,
which cannot survive under a simple regime of majority rule.

45.

See generally Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAw &

CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1992).

46. See Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth ofthe Citizen-Legislator,81
CORNELL L. REv. 623, 624 (1996) (calling the Supreme Court's decision in US. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton "a substantial roadblock" to the term-limits movement).
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